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EDUCATION-FEDERAL STATUTORY RIGHT OF HANDICAPPED
CHILDREN TO AN APPROPRIATE EDUCATION-RESIDENTIAL
PLACEMENT-The United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit has held that a profoundly retarded child has a right to
residential placement to obtain appropriate education guaranteed
by the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 even
though such placement also meets his social and medical needs.
Krue le v. New Castle County School District, 642 F.2d 687 (3d
Cir. 1981).
Paul Kruelle is profoundly retarded and suffers from cerebral
palsy and emotional problems.' In 1973, Paul entered a Pennsyl-
vania public preschool program and was placed in a mixed class
with trainable mentally retarded children.2 In 1977, when Paul
began to vomit in school and have frequent temper tantrums,
public education authorities placed him in a private day care pro-
gram. In 1978, that behavior became more severe and frequent, and
Paul was placed in a twenty-four hour residence-school program4
1.- Paul was eleven years old at the time the suit was initiated. He'has an
Intelligence Quotient well below 30 and the social skills of a six month old child.
Paul could not walk, dress himself, eat unaided, nor was he toilet trained. He
could not speak, his receptive communication level was extremely low, and he
had a history of emotional problems. Kruelle v. Biggs, 489 F. Supp. 169, 172 (D.
Del. 1980), affd sub nom. Kruelle v. New Castle County School Dist., 642 F.2d
687 (3d Cir. 1981).
2. Kruell v. New Castle County School Dist., 642 F.2d 687, 689 (3d Cir.
1981). Persons with Intelligence Quotients ranging from 40 to 54 are classified
as moderately retarded or trainable. These persons are capable of caring for
themselves physically, of being economically productive in sheltered en-
vironments, of participating in recreational activities, and of traveling alone in
familiar places. Academically, however, it is unlikely they will progress past the
second grade. Paul, in contrast was found to be profoundly mentally retarded, a
classification used to describe persons with Intelligence Quotients of less than
25. These persons have minimal physical capabilities and require constant care
and supervision. Haggerty & Sacks, Education of the Handicapped Towards a
Definition of an Appropriate Education, 50 TEMP. L.Q. 961, n.1 (1977).
3. 642 F.2d at 689.
4. Id. Residential treatment is commonly defined as a 24-hour setting pro-
viding shelter, food, special education, and related services. It is distinguished
from a day care program which typically operates only from 9:00 A.M. to 3:00
P.M. North v. District of Columbia Bd. of Educ. 471 F. Supp. 136, 138 n.2
(D.D.C. 1979). The Kruelle court noted that the particular residence-school pro-
gram in which Paul was placed was not a "residential" placement in the sense
of having the living environment and school facilities on the same premises, but
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where he appeared to adjust well.5
When the Kruelle family moved to Delaware in 1979, Paul was
enrolled in Meadowood School6 and placed in a respite care
home.7 The staff at Meadowood developed an individualized
education program (IEP) for Paul which provided for six hours
of instruction per day in a class with trainable mentally retarded
children.9 After Paul had been in this setting for two weeks, his
parents, objecting to the lack of residential placement in
was a combination school program and group home that provided around-the-
clock training by skilled caretakers. 642 F.2d at 689. Funding for this program
was provided by local and state educational agencies, the Department of Public
Welfare, and the Social Security Administration. Id.
5. 642 F.2d at 689.
6. Meadowood School is a specialized public school for handicapped
children, operated by the defendant New Castle County School District. 489 F.
Supp. at 170.
7. 642 F.2d at 689. Respite care is full-time care that provides simple
assistance in eating and dressing as well as reinforcement of skills taught dur-
ing the school day. Id. at n.3.
8. Under the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 20
U.S.C. § 1401-1461 (1976 and Supp. IV 1980), the receipt of federal funds for
education is conditioned upon the state and local educational authorities pro-
viding all handicapped school age children with a free appropriate public educa-
tion. Because of the diversity of individual handicaps, the individualized educa-
tion program is required by the Education Act to insure that each handicapped
child is provided with an education program that is tailored to meet his in-
dividual needs. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(19) (1976) provides:
The term "individualized education program" means a written state-
ment for each handicapped child developed in any meeting by a represen-
tative of the local educational agency or an intermediate education unit
who shall be qualified to provide, or supervise the provision of, specially
designed instruction to meet the unique needs of handicapped children,
the teacher, the parents or guardian of such child and, whenever ap-
propriate, such child, which statement shall include (A) a statement of the
present levels of educational performance of such child, (B) a statement of
annual goals, including short-term instructional objectives, (C) a statement
of the specific educational services to be provided to such child, and the
extent to which such child will be able to participate in regular educa-
tional programs, (D) the projected date for initiation and anticipated dura-
tion of such services, and (E) appropriate objective criteria and evaluation
procedures and schedules for determining, on at least an annual basis,
whether instructional objectives are being achieved.
Id. See generally, Note, The Education for All Handicapped Children Act of
1975, 10 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 110, 136-38 (1976).
9. See supra note 2. In addition to classroom instruction, Paul's IEP pro-
vided for speech therapy, occupational therapy, and physical therapy. 489 F.
Supp. at 170-71.
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Delaware,' withdrew him from the program and challenged
Paul's placement through the administrative process." Both the
district hearing officer and the state level review officer" deter-
mined that the IEP proposed by the Meadowood staff was "ap-
propriate" within the meaning of the Education for All Handicap-
ped Children Act of 1975 (Education Act)'3 and denied the re-
quest for Paul's placement in a residential setting."
The Kruelles sought review in the United States District
Court for the District of Delaware,"5 naming Meadowood and
state authorities as defendants." The defendants maintained that
the day program at Meadowood satisfied Paul's educational
needs and that any necessity for residential placement arose
from Paul's social and emotional problems which were clearly
beyond the competency and responsibility of school officials."
10. 642 F.2d at 689. Paul's parents also objected to Paul's assignment to a
mixed class of trainable mentally retarded which previously had failed in Penn-
sylvania. Id.
11. Id. To assure that handicapped children are receiving an appropriate
education, the Education Act provides procedural safeguards whereby parents
who have a complaint concerning their child's education placement have a right
to an impartial hearing. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(a) & (b) (1976). See generally
Note, supra note 8, at 138-50; Krass, The Right to Public Education for Handi-
capped Children. A Primer for the New Advocate, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 1016,
1067-71.
12. In states such as Delaware, where the hearing is conducted by a local
educational agency or an intermediate educational unit, the party may appeal to
the state educational agency which will conduct an impartial review of the hear-
ing. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(c) (1976).
13. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1461 (1976 and Supp. IV 1980).
14. Specifically, the district hearing officer found that the residential place-
ment was too restrictive for Paul while the state review officer stated that the
full-time services sought were more in the nature of parenting than education.
642 F.2d at 690.
15. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) (1976) provides that any party aggrieved by the
findings and decisions made at the administrative hearing shall have the right
to bring a civil action in a federal, district or state court.
16. The defendants named were the New Castle County School District,
the Supervisory State Board of Education, the Superintendent of the Division
of Public Instruction, as well as the state authorities with general jurisdiction
over programs for handicapped children in Delaware-the Division of Health
and Social Services and Division of Mental Retardation. 642 F.2d at 690.
17. Id. The principal witness for Paul's parents, a child psychiatrist, recom-
mended residential placement for Paul to maximize his chances of learning. The
doctor recommended residential placement because of Paul's need for a consis-
tent environment, and stated that inconsistency of approach, environment or
caretakers led to stress and self-destructive behaviors such as vomiting. Id.
1982]
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The district court held that the present IEP provided by
Meadowood was not a "free appropriate public education" within
the meaning of the Education Act and directed the State Educa-
tion Board to provide Paul with a full-time residential program."
The defendants appealed to the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit, challenging both the residential
placement and the imposition of the order against the state agency
as representing an erroneous interpretation of the requirements
of the Education Act.19 The court of appeals affirmed the district
court's decision, concluding that the district court did not err in
ordering residential placement for Paul under the terms of the
Education Act. The court also determined that the district court
was correct in placing the responsibility for providing an ap-
propriate education for Paul with the State Board of Education."°
In a panel decision authored by Judge Adams,' the court of
appeals first recognized that the Education Act embodies a
strong federal policy of providing a free, appropriate public
education for every handicapped child.2 The court observed that
the Education Act does not provide an overly detailed program,
but instead establishes only procedural guidelines and safe-
guards, leaving school officials and parents great discretion in
the creation of IEPs 3 The court pointed out, however, that the
18. 489 F. Supp. at 173. The district court found that Paul required a
greater degree of consistency than many other profoundly retarded children. Id.
19. :642 F.2d at 690.
20. Id. at 698-99.
21. Judges Van Dusen and Gibbons joined in the opinion.
22. 642 F.2d at 690. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401 note c (1976) which provides:
It is the purpose of this Act [this chapter] to assure that all handi-
capped children have available to them, within the time periods specified
in section 612(2)(B) [section 1412(2)(B) of this title], a free appropriate
public education which emphasizes special education and related services
designated to meet their unique needs, to assure that the rights of handi-
capped children and their parents or guardians are protected, to assist
States and localities to provide for the education of all handicapped
children, and to assess and assure the effectiveness of efforts to educate
handicapped children.
Id. See also Note, supra note 8, at 118-24.
23. 642 F.2d at 691. The court reasoned that Congress refrained from im-
plementing overly detailed programs, recognizing the broad range of special
needs presented by handicapped children, the lack of agreement within the
medical and educational professions on what constituted an appropriate educa-
tion, and the tradition of state and local control over educational matters. Id.
See Note, Enforcing the Right to an "Appropriate" Education: The Education
for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1103, 1109-14
(1979).
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Education Act does define "free appropriate public education 2 4
and specifically defines its component parts, "special education 2 5
and "related services."'
Noting that the regulations promulgated under the Education
Act explicitly contemplate residential placement,' the court also
recognized that other federal court decisions have held a residen-
tial setting to be consistent with the purposes and directives of
the Education Act.' Because all parties conceded that Paul needed
24. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(18) (1976) provides:
The term "free appropriate public education" means special education
and related services which (A) have been provided at public. expense,
under public supervision and direction, and without charge, (B) meet the
standards of the State educational agency, (C) include an appropriate pre-
school, elementary or secondary school education in the State involved,
and (D) are provided in conformity with the individualized education pro-
gram required under section 1414(a)(5) of this title.
Id.
25. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(16) (1976) provides:
The term "special education" means specially designed instruction, at
no cost to parents or guardians, to meet the unique needs of a handi-
capped child, including classroom instruction, instruction in physical
education, home instruction and instruction in hospitals and institutions.
Id.
26. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(17) (1976) provides:
The term "related services" means transportation, and such
developmental, corrective and other supportive services (including speech
pathology and audiologogy, psychological services, physical and occupa-
tional therapy, recreation and medical and counseling services, except
that such medical services shall be for diagnostic and evaluation purposes
only) as may be required to assist a handicapped child to benefit from
special education, and includes the early identification and assessment of
handicapping conditions in children.
Id.
27. 45 C.F.R. § 121a.302 (1980) provides:
If placement in a public or private residential program is necessary to
provide special education and related serv'ices to a handicapped child, the
program, including non-medical care and room and board, must be at no
cost to the parents of the child.
Id. The accompanying comment provides:
This requirement applies to placements which are made by public agen-
cies for educational purposes, and includes placement in State-operated
schools for the handicapped such as a state school for the deaf or blind.
45 C.F.R. § 121a.302 (comment).
. 28. 642 F.2d at 693. See Capello v. District of Columbia Bd. of Educ., 3
EDUC. HANDICAPPED L. REP (CRR) 551-500 (D.D.C. Jan. 23, 1980) (residential
placement of a retarded, autistic youth ordered at the expense of the defendant
school board, upon doctor's recommendation of a consistent residential setting
and upon prior success in this type of setting); Matthews v. Campbell, 3 EDUC.
HANDICAPPED L. REP. (CRR) 551:264, (E.D. Va. July 16, 1979) (because of lack of
meaningful progress in certain areas of training, residential placement ordered
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some type of full-time assistance and that the Education Act
specifically provided for residential placement in certain in-
stances,' the court of appeals viewed the issue before it as
whether the trial judge correctly construed the Education Act as
requiring more continuous supervision for Paul in order to meet
the standard of a free, appropriate public education, than he was
receiving under the Meadowood program. 0
Relying upon the logic of its 1980 decision in Battle v. Com-
monwealth of Pennsylvania"1 and case law emerging from other
federal courts, the court of appeals upheld the district court's
findings.32 The court noted that in Battle it had found that the
per se application of the 180-school-day rule, which is accepted as
appropriate for the nonhandicapped child, cannot be presumed to
satisfy the unique needs of handicapped children.33 Analogizing
to its holding in Battle, the Kruelle court stated that the defen-
dant school authorities were incorrect to assume that the six-
hour day, which suffices for the nonhandicapped child, would ful-
fill their obligations to the handicapped child.3
The court rejected the defendants' contention that Paul re-
quired residential placement only for medical and domiciliary
for a profoundly retarded child despite serious misgivings about the ultimate ef-
ficacy of a residential placement for this child); North v. District of Columbia
Bd. of Educ. 471 F. Supp. 136 (D.D.C. 1979) (ordering an injunction requiring
residential placement of a multiply handicapped youth at no cost to parents in
order to comply with a mandate of the Education Act to provide an appropriate
education); Ladson v. Board of Educ. of Dist. of Columbia Gov't 3, EDUC. HANDI-
CAPPED L. REP. (CRR) 551:188 (D.D.C. Mar. 12, 1979) (court concluded, based
upon its independent assessment, that the defendant school district must pro-
vide the plaintiff, a profoundly retarded child, with a residential placement at
no cost to parents, in order to meet the goals of her IEP).
29. 642 F.2d at 692. See supra notes 24-26. See also U.S.C. § 1413(a)(4)(B)
(1976) which provides that the receipt of federal funds under the Education Act
is contingent upon the State having approved policies and procedures that
assure that handicapped children in private schools and facilities will be provided
special education and related services at no cost to their parents, if such place-
ment is necessary to carry out the requirements of the Education Act.
30. 642 F.2d at 692-93.
31. 629 F.2d 269 (3d Cir. 1980) cert. denied sub nom. Scanlon v. Battle, 101
S. Ct. 3123 (1981).
32. 642 F.2d at 693.
33. Id. See 629 F.2d at 280. Other federal courts have invalidated the tradi-
tional 180 day rule as being incompatiable with the Education Act's emphasis
upon the individual's unique needs. See Georgia Assoc. of Retarded Citizens v.
McDaniel, 511 F. Supp. 1263 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
34. 642 F.2d at 693.
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care and not for educational purposes. Again citing Battle, the
court asserted that education is a broad concept as applied to the
handicapped.' Also, the court recognized that a recent decision
by the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
collapsed the distinction between residential placement as a
necessary predicate for learning and the provision of services
unrelated to learning skills, and had declared that it was impossi-
ble to separate emotional and educational needs in complex
cases.3
The Kruelle court stated that the inextricability of medical
and educational grounds for certain services does not justify the
court's abdication of its decision-making role. Instead, the court
viewed the unseverability of such needs as the very basis for
holding that the services are an essential prerequisite to learn-
ing.37 The court determined that the absence of a structured en-
vironment was partially responsible for Paul's vomiting and
choking which, in turn, interfered with his ability to learn."
35. The Battle court stated that formal education begins at the point when
basic self-help and social skills such as toilet training, dressing, feeding, and
communicating are lacking. 629 F.2d at 275. The Kruelle court stated that Con-
gress was aware of the foundational nature of the handicapped individual's
education because the Education Act provides for a free appropriate education
for all children regardless of the severity of their handicap. 642 F.2d at 693. See
20 U.S.C. § 1412(2)(c) (1976). The Education Act also gives priority to all
children not presently receiving an education and those with the most severe
handicaps who are receiving an inadequate education. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(3) (1976).
36. 642 F.2d at 694. See North v. Dist. of Columbia Bd. of Educ., 471 F.
Supp. 136 (D.D.C. 1979). The issue before the North court was whether residen-
tial placement of a multiply handicapped youth was required for emotional
problems and therefore the responsibility of the parents or social service agen-
cies, or whether full-time placement was essential for learning. The court issued
an injunction naming the defendant school board responsible for the residential
treatment of the youth. Id. at 141.
37. 642 F.2d at 694. The court cited Tatro v. Texas, 625 F.2d 557 (5th Cir.
1980), as a recent example. The Tatro court held that the provision of a clean
instrument catheterization procedure was a related service within the meaning
of the Education Act, reasoning that without clean instrument catheterization
the child could not be present in the classroom to benefit from the special
education to which she was entitled. See also Tokarcik v. Forest Hills School
Dist., 3 EDUC. HANDICAPPED L. REP. (CRR) 552:427 (W.D. Pa. May 19, 1980),
affl'd, 665 F.2d 443 (3d Cir. 1981) (citing the rationale of Tatro, court held clean
instrument catheterization to be a related service within the meaning of the
Education Act).
38. 642 F.2d at 694. The court asserted that it would be difficult to con-
ceive of a more apt case than Paul's for which the unique needs of a child re-
quired residential placement. Id. The court also discussed the mainstreaming
1982]
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Acknowledging that the provision of an appropriate education
places a substantial burden on the state in certain instances, the
court concluded that the ordering of residential placement did
not impose a duty beyond the contemplation of the Education
Act.39 The court noted that the language, the broad statutory in-
tent, and the legislative history of the Education Act simply did
not entertain the possibility that some children might be untrain-
able. Thus, under the Education Act, schools are required to pro-
vide a comprehensive range of services to accommodate a handi-
capped child's educational needs regardless of financial and ad-
ministrative burdens, and, if necessary, to provide residential
placement. 0
The court stated that the Education Act explicitly provides
that the state education agency be primarily responsible for im-
plementation of an appropriate education program for the handi-
capped. 1 The court asserted that the defendant's contention, that
policy of the Education Act which encourages handicapped children to be
educated in the least restrictive environment. Id. at 695 (citing 20 U.S.C. §
1412(5)(B) (1976)). Citing the trial judge's remarks in Dewalt v. Burkholder, 3
EDUC. HANDICAPPED L. REP. (CRR) 551:500, (E.D. Va. Mar. 13, 1980), the court
concluded that there was no issue of which was the least restrictive environ-
ment once a court concluded that residential placement was the only realistic
option for learning improvements. Because day school cannot provide an ap-
propriate education, it is not a possible alternative. Id.
39. 642 F.2d at 695-96.
40. The court distinguished between the cases arising under the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794, (1976 and Supp. IV 1980) and the
Education Act observing that section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act prohibits
discrimination against otherwise qualified handicapped individuals in a federally
funded program solely by reason of his handicap, but does not require more
than evenhanded treatment of the handicapped and non-handicapped by state
agencies. 642 F.2d at 695. See Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442
U.S. 397 (1979). Addressing the issue of unlimited funds, the Kruelle court
noted that the education authorities are not confined to the funds received
under the Education Act for alternative federal funds are available to aid the
states in fulfilling their responsibility to the handicapped. 642 F.2d at 698. See
S. REP. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 1425, 1447 [hereinafter Senate Rep. No. 94-168].
41. 642 F.2d at 696. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(6) (1976), which provides:
The State educational agency shall be responsible for assuring that the
requirements of this subchapter are carried out and that all educational
programs for handicapped children within the State, including all such
programs administered by any other State or local agency, will be under
the general supervision of the persons responsible for educational pro-
grams for handicapped children in the State educational agency and shall
meet education standards of the State educational agency.
Id. The court noted that the legislative history of the Education Act indicated
[Vol. 20:537
Recent Decisions
the state is to function solely as a supervisory agency and there-
fore should not be responsible for coordinating efforts to develop
an IEP for Paul or to insure funds, distorted the impact of the
district court's directive, mischaracterized the accountability the
judge ascribed, and contradicted federal and state statutes.
Because Paul's unique needs were covered by the Education
Act, the court concluded that it was unnecessary to determine if
Paul would also be eligible under the Developmentally Disabled
and Assistance Bill of Rights Act."
The Education Act was enacted in response to an increased
awareness of the educational needs of handicapped children" and
that a full committee considered the establishment of a single agency to be
responsible for assuring that the right to education for all handicapped children
was of paramount importance. 642 F.2d at 696. See Senate Rep. No. 94-168,
supra note 40, 1448. The court also observed that the regulations implementing
section 1412(6) of the Education Act also reflect the congressional desire for a
central point of accountability. 642 F.2d at 697 (citing 45 C.F.R. § 1212.600
(1980)).
42. 642 F.2d at 697. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 3110 (1981) which pro-
vides that the State Board of Education shall make rules and regulations to
carry out the Education Act. See also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 3120 (1981)
which provides that the State Board of Education shall be responsible for the
implementation of programs that assure that each handicapped child shall
receive a free and adequate public education designed to meet his or her needs.
The Kruelle court stated that the district court did not direct the state to
engage in a detailed development of a specific education program for Paul, but
instead directed the state board to insure that a proper evaluation of Paul's
needs be undertaken and an appropriate plan be implemented. By placing the
burden for coordinating efforts and financial arrangements for Paul's education
on the State Board of Education, the trial judge was reflecting legislative intent
and appropriately observing the limits of his institutional role. 642 F.2d at 697.
The court stated that the trial judge properly left the provision of an ap-
propriate education to the discretion of the state agencies instead of prescribing
a program himself. Id.
43. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6081 (1976). The Kruelle court observed that the
legislative history of this act indicated that it was intended to supplement, not
supplant, the Education Act. 642 F.2d at 698. The Kruelle court also observed
that the district court had ruled that the complaint stated a cause of action
solely under the Education Act, and the parties agreed to try the issue within
the confines of the Education Act. 489 F. Supp. at 170. In a post-trial letter
memorandum, the defendants asserted that the Developmentally Disabled
Assistance and Bill of Rights Act was the proper statute under which Paul was
entitled to relief. 642 F.2d at 698.
44. Senate Rep. No. 94-168, supra note 40, at 1431. The Bureau of Educa-
tion for the Handicapped estimated that in 1975 there were more than eight
million children up to age 21 with handicapping conditions requiring special
education and related services, but only 3.9 million of those children were
receiving an appropriate education, 1.75 million were not receiving any educa-
1982] 545
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landmark court decisions that established the right to education
for the handicapped.45 In 1954, in Brown v. Board of Education,6
the United States Supreme Court established that all children
must be guaranteed an equal educational opportunity; 7 but prior
to 1966 the federal government did little to insure this oppor-
tunity for the handicapped. 8 Recognizing the need for a strong
administrative body to provide leadership in the area of educa-
tion for the handicapped, Congress in 1966 established the
Bureau of Education for the Handicapped 49 and in 1970 passed
the Education of Handicapped Children Act, which authorizes
grants to the states to assist them in initiating, expanding and
improving programs for the handicapped.50
While the federal government continued to function as a
catalyst for local and state program growth, it did not provide
full support to programs for the handicapped." The federal
courts, however, became increasingly aware of the educational
needs of the handicapped and the necessity of an expanded
federal fiscal role.
tional services at all, and 2.5 million were receiving an appropriate education.
Id. at 1432. The Education Act defines the handicapped to include the mentally
retarded, hard of hearing, deaf, speech impaired, visually handicapped, seriously
emotionally disturbed, orthopedically impaired, other health-impaired children
or children with specific learning disabilities, who by reason thereof require
special education and related services. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(1) (1976).
45. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Citizens v. Penn-
sylvania, 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971), modified, 343 F. Supp. 279 (1972).
See also, Mills v. Bd. of Educ. of Dist. of Columbia, 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C.
1972).
46. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
47. Id. at 493. The Brown court did not establish a right to education per
se, but stated that where a state has undertaken to provide education, it has
created a right which must be made available to all on equal terms. See Hag-
gerty & Sacks, supra note 2, at 962-63 for a discussion of the Brown decision in
relation to the education of the handicapped.
48. Senate Rep. No. 94-168, supra note 40, at 1429. In 1966, Title VI, which
established a grant program to assist states in the initiation, expansion and im-
provement of programs and projects for the educationally handicapped, was
added by an amendment to the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of
1965. See Pub. L. No. 89-750, § 161, 80 Stat. 1204 (1966), amending Pub. L. No.
89-110, 79 Stat. 27 (1965). For an extensive discussion of prior state and federal
legislation, see Note, supra note 8, at 118-24.
49. Senate Rep. No. 94-168, supra note 40, at 1429.
50. Id. Pub. L. No. 91-230, §§ 601-662, 84 Stat. 175 (codified at 20 U.S.C.
§§ 1401-1461 (1970), amending Elementary and Secondary Education Act of
1965, Title VI, 80 Stat. 1204 (1966)).
51. Senate Rep. No. 94-168, supra note 40, at 1429.
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In Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children v. Pennsyl-
vania," a class action brought in federal district court on behalf
of all mentally retarded children in Pennsylvania, a declaration
was sought that Pennsylvania statutes which either excluded,
postponed admission of, or excused the attendance of certain
retarded children from the public school system were unconstitu-
tional.' Because unanimous expert testimony disclosed that all
mentally retarded persons can benefit from some type of educa-
tional program, the parties entered into a consent agreement
which obligated the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to place
each mentally retarded child in a free public program of educa-
tion and training appropriate to the child's capacity.'
In Mills v. Board of Education of District of Columbia,55 decided
immediately after the Pennsylvania case, the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia ordered the District
of Columbia to provide every exceptional child' with a free and
suitable public education regardless of the child's mental,
52. 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971), modified, 343 F. Supp. 279 (1972).
This case was not a full-scale trial on the merits but was limited to the jurisdic-
tional determination of the existance of colorable constitutional claims.
53. 343 F. Supp. at 279-82. The plaintiffs' constitutional arguments rested
upon the assertions that: (1) the statutes offended due process because they
lacked any provision for notice and a hearing before a retarded person is either
excluded or transferred from a public education system; (2) two of the statutes
violated equal protection because they were premised on the assumption, un-
supported factually, that certain retarded children are uneducable; and (3)
because Pennsylvania guaranteed an education to all children, two of the
statues violated due process by arbitrarily and capriciously denying that right
to some retarded children. Id. at 283.
54. Id. at 285. For the full text of the modified consent agreement see id.
at 306. Because the court was limited to an inquiry about the fairness of the
settlement, it was not required to comment on the constitutional issues. See
Haggerty & Sacks, supra note 2, at 963 and accompanying text. The court,
however, undertook a discussion of these issues and stated that labeling a per-
son "retarded" creates a stigma and that precedent holds that if a state labels a
person in such a way to stigmatize him, due process requires notice and an op-
portunity to be heard. 343 F. Supp. at 294-95. The court also stated that
because uncontestable expert testimony had disclosed that all mentally retarded
persons are capable of benefiting from a program of education, there was
serious doubt that there was a rational basis for the total exclusion of the
retarded from public education. Id. at 297. See Haggerty & Sacks, supra note 2,
at 968-69.
55. 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).
56. The court defined the term "exceptional children" to include mentally
retarded, emotionally disturbed, physically handicapped, hyperactive and
children with other behavioral problems. Id. at 868.
1982]
Duquesne Law Review
physical or emotional disability.57 The Mills court stated that the
District of Columbia's denial of a publicly supported education to
exceptional children while providing such education to other
children was violative of due process.58 The court concluded that
a child eligible for publicly supported education could not be ex-
cluded from public school unless he is provided with adequate
alternative educational services suited to his individual needs."
These decisions recognized the gross inequities suffered by
handicapped children.' It was not until 1974, however, with the
enactment of the Education of the Handicapped Amendments of
1974,1 that Congress recognized the need for an expanded pro-
gram of federal assistance to remedy them. The amendments
mandated comprehensive planning, the delivery of additional
financial assistance to the states, and the protection of handicap-
ped children's rights with due process procedures. 2 They were
unsatisfactory, however, because funding was still inadequate
and the actual implementation of the programs was slow.63 A
previous bill, reintroduced as the Education for All Handicapped
Children Act of 1975,4 was intended to establish a comprehen-
sive mechanism that would expand previous provisions for the
handicapped and insure maximum benefits to handicapped
children and their families.65
57. Id. at 878. The Mills Court addressed the constitutional issues but
limited its discussion because the defendant did not dispute its obligation to
provide education for handicapped children. See Note, supra note 8, at n.20 and
accompanying text.
58. 348 F. Supp. at 875. The court further stated that due process requires
a hearing prior to any suspension, expulsion, or transfer of these exceptional
children. Id.
59. Id. at 878. A child who is excluded must receive a constitutionally ade-
quate hearing and periodic review of his status, progress, and the adequacy of
his alternative educational program. Id.
60. Note, supra note 23, at 1105.
61. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1461 (Supp. IV 1974), amending 20 U.S.C. §§
1401-1461 (1970).
62. Senate Rep. No. 94-168, supra note 40, at 1430.
63. Note, supra note 8, at 120-121.
64. Senate Rep. No. 94-168, supra note 40, at 1430.
65. Id. This Act provided for a new grant formula which escalated funds
until 1982. The annual cost for a fully funded program was estimated to be in
excess of 3.1 billion dollars by 1982. See 20 U.S.C. § 1411 (1976 and Supp. IV
1980); Note, supra note 8, at 1212. The Act also restricted the procedures for
application and fund reimbursement by requiring the state educational agency
to screen applications from the local agencies and then submit a single state ap-
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The Education Act requires the state to provide a free ap-
propriate public education for all handicapped children from ages
three through twenty-one."8 The term "appropriate" is defined as
special education and related services provided in conformity
with an individualized education program." Because Congress
consciously fashioned the Education Act in broad terms to en-
compass a program for each child's unique needs, the Education
Act does not attempt to prescribe specific education programs."
It includes, however, detailed procedural safeguards to secure
the rights of the handicapped child such as parental involvement
in the "appropriate" placement of the child." Administrative and
judicial remedies are available if the parent chooses to challenge
such placement. 0
The broad mandate of the Education Act to furnish each
handicapped child with an appropriate education has become the
center of conflict between parents, who contend that optimal ser-
vices must be provided to meet the standard of appropriateness,
plication to the Commissioner of Education, with the burden of monitoring local
agency compliance upon the state agency. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414 (1976 Supp. IV
1980). Finally, the Act set forth specific eligibility requirements to which a state
must comply in order to receive federal funds. See generally 20 U.S.C. § 1412
(1976 and Supp. IV 1980).
66. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(1)(B) (1976).
67. See supra notes 8, 24-26.
68. Congress adopted this approach because of the variety of special needs
presented by children with different handicaps, the lack of agreement among
educators about what programs are most effective, the Aeed for flexibility and
experimentation, and the traditional notion that education is primarily a state
and local concern. Note, supra note 23, at 1108-09.
69. The parents are entitled to develop their child's IEP along with the
teacher, a representative of the supervising state agency, and the child when
appropriate. 20 U.S.C. § 1410(19) (1976).
70. The parents may present a complaint on any matter relating to the
identification, evaluation or educational placement of the child, or the provision
of a free appropriate public education to such child. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1)(E)
(1976). Upon receipt of the complaint, the parents are entitled to a due process
hearing and ultimately may seek review in a state or federal court. See generally
20 U.S.C. § 1415 (1976). One commentator stated that the heart of the Education
Act is the prodedural safeguards, but that the voices of many parents may
never be heard. He observed that many parents do not fully understand their
child's handicap and will unquestionably rely upon the teacher's judgments.
Poorer parents may forego the challenge because of the expense, and the less
educated parent may not understand the complexity of issues involved in mak-
ing a placement decision or that a parent even has the right to challenge his
child's placement. Note, supra note 23, at 1110-11.
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and school officials, who because of budgetary constraints, main-
tain that appropriateness means something less.7' Because the
Act is remedial in nature, it should be construed in favor of the
class it was designed to benefit;" but a concern has arisen that
broad interpretations of the Act may result in limitless benefits
at the expense of local and state agencies.73
Attempting to fashion a standard of appropriateness, some
courts have observed that an appropriate education is not the
same as the best education. 4 Others have held that it requires
each handicapped child be given an opportunity to achieve his
full potential commensurate with the opportunity given to other
children.5 Still others allow the states to retain their prerogative
71. This conflict between parents and school officials over the standard of
appropriateness was predicted, see, e.g., Note, supra note 23, at 1125, and
evidenced by case law. One commentator, citing recent court decisions, noted
that in the past parents have been satisfied with the most rudimentary educa-
tional services, but that today they are demanding full compliance with the law.
See, Numerous Right to Education Cases Better Define Boundaries of the
Federal Law, 4 MENTAL HEALTH AND DISABILITIES J. 402-07 (1980).
72. S-1 v. Turlington, 635 F.2d 342, 347 (5th Cir. 1981).
73. See, e.g., Tatro v. Texas, 625 F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 1980) (court of appeals
noted district court's concern that to include catheterization within the scope of
related services may be a broader interpretation than Congress intended).
Pinkerton v. Moye, 509 F. Supp. 107 (W.D. Va. 1981) (noting that the Education
Act did not require the provision of the best education but rather an ap-
propriate education, court emphasized the importance of weighing competing in-
terests); Note, supra note 23, at 1125 ("appropriate" cannot mean the best possi-
ble education that a school can provide if given access to unlimited funds).
74. See Springdale School Dist. v. Grace, 494 F. Supp. 266 (W.D. Ark.
1980), aff'd, 656 F.2d 300 (8th Cir. 1981) (ordering Arkansas school officials to
place profoundly deaf child in a local public school rather than specialized school
for the deaf upon finding that the local school could provide an "appropriate"
education even though the special school could provide for the "best"
education).
75. See Rowley v. Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Central School Dist.,
483 F. Supp. 528, 534 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd, 632 F.2d 945 (2d Cir. 1980), cert.
granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3351 (U.S. Nov. 2, 1981) (No. 80-1002). The district court in
Rowley held that a deaf student was entitled to receive the services of a sign
language interpreter in the classroom under the Education Act even though she
was performing better than the average student in her class without the
assistance of an interpreter. 483 F. Supp. at 529. Stating that an appropriate
education must lie between the two extremes of an adequate education that
would simply enable a child to progress from grade to grade, and an education
that would enable the handicapped child to achieve his full potential, the court
concluded that the appropriateness standard requires that each handicapped
child be given an opportunity to achieve his full potential commensurate with
the opportunity given to the non-handicapped child of similar intellectual
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in allocating their financial resources."6
The Third Circuit's decision in Kruelle, that the Education Act
and its regulations contemplate residential placement if
necessary to meet the standard of a "free appropriate public
education," is consistent with case law." In 1979, the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia in Ladson v.
Board of Education for the District of Columbia"8 acknowledged
that residential placement is authorized under the Education Act
and its regulations." After conducting an independent assess-
ment of the evidence, the Ladson court concluded that the plain-
tiff required a twenty-four hour care program to meet the goals
of her individualized education program and ordered the defen-
dant school district to provide it.s" Later that year, in North v.
District of Columbia Board of Education,8 the same court again
held that the defendant Board of Education was required to pro-
calibre, energy, and initiative. Id. at 534. Affirming on appeal, the Second Cir-
cuit cautioned that this case was of limited precedential value because of its
unique facts. 632 F.2d at 948 n.7.
76. See Pinkerton v. Moye, 509 F. Supp. 107 (W.D. Va. 1981). Stating that
the Education Act intrudes into the state's traditional decision-making role in
educational matters and that the Education Act was not intended to supplant
the state's perogative in allocating its financial resources, the Pinkerton court
asserted that Congress intended the states to balance the competing interest of
economic necessity with the special needs of the handicapped in making the
determination of what constitutes an appropriate education. Id. at 113.
Therefore, the court balanced a learning disabled child's need for a "self-
contained" program and the county's limited educational resources. The court
reached a reasonable accommodation by ordering the child to be placed in an
existing "self-contained" program located in another school district only 6 miles
further than the child's home district rather than ordering the home district to
initiate such a program which would benefit only a few students. Id. at 113-14.
Also, the court noted that failure to consider all the competing interests would
ultimately work to circumvent Congress's intent to educate all handicapped
children as well as practicable, for excessive expenditures made to meet the
needs of one handicapped child would reduce the amount of funds that could be
spent to meet the needs of other handicapped children. Id. at 113.
77. 642 F.2d at 643. See infra notes 78-90 and accompanying text.
78. 3 EDUC. HANDICAPPED L. REP. (CRR) 551:188 (D.D.C. Mar. 12, 1979).
79. Id. at 189.
80. The plaintiff in Ladson was profoundly retarded with the mental
capacity of an 18-month-old child. She could not speak or walk up or down
stairs, and could barely respond to directions. The Ladson court agreed that the
prior IEP only partially met the child's educational needs and found that
because of the nature and severity of her handicaps, residential placement was
necessary as a comprehensive educational program.
81. 471 F. Supp. 136 (D.D.C. 1979).
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vide residential placement in order to provide an appropriate
education as mandated by the Education Act.2 In North, all par-
ties agreed that the plaintiff needed residential placement, but
the defendant contended that the youth's problems were non-
educational and disclaimed responsibility. The court ordered
residential placement after finding the child's educational, emo-
tional, and medical problems inseparable, and stated that it was
clear under the Education Act that the defendant Board of
Education was responsible for providing a child with residential
placement when appropriate."
In Matthews v. Campbell,4 the District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia stated that there was no doubt that a federal
court may order the state to federally fund a residential place-
ment if a competent decision maker determined that the child
was not receiving an appropriate education in a public school.8
Acknowledging the possible shortcomings of residential
placement86 and that the evidence in the case supported the
defendant school board's contention that they had asserted max-
imum diligence in working with the child in the day program, the
Matthews court found a disturbing lack of meaningful progress
in certain fundamental areas of training. The court stated that
Congress left it no choice but to consider residential placement
for the child.87
In Capello v. District of Columbia Board of Education,88 the
District Court of the District of Columbia, citing its earlier deci-
82. The North court referred to 45 C.F.R. § 121a. 302 (1950), see supra note
27, and 20 U.S.C. § 1412(6) (1976), supra note 41. The child in North was a
multiply handicapped 16-year-old diagnosed as epileptic, emotionally disturbed,
and learning disabled. He was residentially placed, later discharged because the
school could no longer deal with him, and then turned over to the Department
of Human Resources while the suit was pending.
83. 471 F. Supp. at 141.
84. 3 EDUc. HANDICAPPED L. REP. (CRR) 551:264 (E.D. Va. July 16, 1979).
85. Id. at 266.
86. The defendant's expert witnesses stated that high staff turnover,
limited exposure to non-handicapped children, emotional trauma resulting from
removal from one's family, and re-entry difficulties are sometimes potential
problems in residential homes. Id. at 265-66. The Matthews court itself expressed
concern about the ultimate efficacy of residential placement for this severly/pro-
foundly retarded youth, and raised the possibility that residential placement
may not be appropriate for him. Id. at 266.
87. Id. at 265-66.
88. 3 EDUC. HANDICAPPED L. REP. (CRR) 551:500 (D.D.C. Jan. 23, 1980).
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sions in Ladson and North, ordered the defendant Board of
Education to provide residential placement for an eighteen-year-
old, retarded and autistic youth because of his previous success
in a residential setting and a pediatric neurologist's recommenda-
tion of residential placement in a calm setting.89 State courts also
have determined that if residential placement is necessary for a
child to receive an appropriate education under the Education
Act, the school district must be responsible for such placement9
It must be noted that because the underlying purpose of the
Education Act requires that each child's unique handicap be con-
sidered, decisions interpreting "appropriate" education have
been based on the unique needs of the individual child before the
court. The success of the Education Act depends upon the deci-
sion maker's ability to create an educational program for each
handicapped child in the absence of clear statutory guidance.9
The judiciary, however, may not possess the competence to
resolve matters of educational policy. The Supreme Court in
Brown v. Board of Education emphasized that education is a
function of state and local government.' Later, in San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriguez," the Court stated that
education is an area which the Court lacks specialized knowledge
and observed that experience counsels against the Court's
premature interference with informed judgments made at state
and local levels.4
89. Id. at 501.
90. See, Wallingford Bd. of Educ. v. State Bd. of Educ., 3 EDUC. HANDI-
CAPPED L. REP. (CRR) 552:305 (Super. Ct. Conn. 1981) (because out of state
residential placement was required to provide the plaintiff with an appropriate
education, the court held that under the Education Act and Connecticut
statutes the local education authorities were required to pay for the costs of
such placement); In the Matter of Scott K, 92 Misc. 2d 681, 400 N.Y.S. 2d 289
(1977) (local school board required under the Education Act to provide residen-
tial placement of handicapped child for 12 months per year because the child's
needs required such placement); Mahoney v. Admin. School Dist. No. 1, 42 Or.
App. 665, 601 P.2d 826 (1979) (Education Act required that local school board
pay for placement of mentally retarded child in private facility which offers a
year-round residential program because such program was necessary to provide
the child with an appropriate education).
91. The term "decision maker" refers to the state representative or
teacher who created the IEP or to the review officer or judge who determined
whether a challenged IEP is appropriate.
92. 347 U.S. at 493. See also supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
93. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
94. Id. at 42.
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This judicial discomfort in resolving educational matters was
also expressed by the Third Circuit in Battle. The Battle court
expressed concern that the formulation of a standard of "ap-
propriateness" is extremely difficult, and the questions involving
handicaps which affect a child's learning abilities approach the
limits of judicial competence." Recognizing the traditional role of
the states in educational matters, the Battle court stated that
rather than leaving the judiciary to flounder in uncertain educa-
tional waters, the Education Act contemplated that its goals are
matters that are to be established in the first instance by the
states.96
Although the Kruelle court recognized that the issue raised in
that case was one of first impression in the Third Circuit,97 the
rationale of its decision is consistent with its earlier decision in
Battle. The combined decisions have established the parameters
of the Education Act. The Kruelle decision is the first decision at
the court of appeals level establishing that residential placement
is a permissible alternative within the Education Act if such
placement is necessary to meet the standard of an appropriate
education. Now that Kruelle has interpreted this aspect of the
Education Act, the Act's goals can be furthered if state and local
officials are able to determine whether residential placement is
appropriate without further resort to the judiciary.
Kathryn L. Bindas
95. 629 F.2d at 277.
96. Id. at 277-78. This judicial discomfort could be interpreted as a signal of
the judiciary's reluctance to involve itself further in the interpretation and ap-
plication of the Education Act. This reluctance was apparent in Riley v. Am-
bach, 688 F.2d 635 (2d Cir. 1981), where the Second Circuit held that the district
court should have required the plaintiff to exhaust state administrative
remedies before bringing suit in the federal court. Id. at 642. The Riley court
stated that when decisions are difficult and technical, state experts should first
have their say because of their familiarity with the factors that affect ad-
ministration. This would create a record at the administrative hearing that
would aid the federal court. Second, the court stated that both state and federal
courts have an interest in providing a means whereby offical abuse can be cor-
rected without resort to a lengthy and costly trial. Id.
97. 642 F.2d at 688.
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